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Oceans Report
BURT L. SAUNDERS*
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:
EIGHTH SESSION

The Eighth Session of the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) resumed in New York City on July 16,

1979. Much had been accomplished during the first six weeks of
negotiations in Geneva,1 but it was clear that much difficult work

remained when the Eighth Session resumed. Many felt that time was
running out for UNCLOS. Governments had grown weary of financing protracted negotiations that appeared to be going nowhere. Dur-

ing the opening plenary, President Amerasinghe 2 noted that the
Conference must proceed with a deep sense of urgency. From all
indications, governments were losing patience, and at the outset, it

was hoped that all unresolved Committee I hard-core issues would
be resolved within the first three weeks of the resumed session.
Though the goal of concluding all substantive negotiations during
this session was not met, the final reports of the Committee Chairmen

reflect substantial progress toward agreement on most remaining hardcore issues. At the conclusion of the Eighth Session, U.S. Ambassador
Elliot Richardson noted that "the successful completion of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is now in sight." 8

Richardson commented further that member nations "have marshalled
* LL.M. 1979, University of Miami School of Law; J.D. 1975, William and
Mary Law School. Mr. Saunders is an Assistant County Attorney for Dade
County, Florida.
1. See Oceans Report, 11 LAw. AM. 567 (1979).
2. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/SR.117 (1979) where the President of the
Conference notes:
Through the zeal and persistence of the Chairmen of the Main Committees and the Chairman of the Negotiating Groups, and with the
cooperation of delegations, it had been possible to prepare the first
revision of the informal composite negotiating text (A/Conf.62/WP.10/
Rev.1), issued after the suspension of the eighth session. With the
presentation of that revised text, the Conference had reached a new
phase in its work.
Mr. Amerasinghe was elected President of the Conference in its first session in
Caracas and has continued in that capacity.
3. Remarks of U.S. Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, Mr.
Elliot Richardson, during the Eighth Session of UNCLOS in New York. See
Soundings, Volume IV, No. 4 (September-October, 1979).
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the political will to overcome whatever obstacles block the road to
a treaty." 4
The ambitious schedule for the Conference's next negotiating
session is indicative of the desire to conclude substantive negotiations
in 1980 and to begin the treaty ratification process in Caracas in 1981.
Work on final clauses I will be concluded in an informal plenary
during the first two weeks of the Ninth Session. This Session will be
conducted in two five-week meetings, the first in New York beginning
on March 3, 1980, and the second beginning on July 28, 1980, in
Geneva. During this same period, all substantive negotiations of
the three Committees should be completed, along with the final
revision of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT). Debate
on the revised ICNT is expected to conclude within two weeks, the
goal being the conversion of the revised ICNT into a final Conference
document to serve as a draft convention by the end of the sixth
week of the Session. The remainder of the Ninth Session will be
used to discuss the questions of amendments, reservations, relation
to other conventions, entry into force, transitional provisions, and
participation in the Convention.
It is believed that with the informal intersessional meetings and
serious and conscientious negotiations during the Ninth Session, substantive negotiations can be completed in 1980. However, there are
critical areas of disagreement which could result in delay. Additionally, although much time was spent during the Eighth Session
on the questions of final clauses, reservations, entry into force, and
participation in the Convention, problems in these areas could prove
to be insurmountable. These procedural questions, now expected to
be addressed fully at the conclusion of substantive negotiations, pose
the most serious problems for UNCLOS.
The difficult issues faced during the resumed Eighth Session
were primarily those dealing with deep seabed mining (Committee I).
It is noteworthy that the greatest achievement in New York was the
resolution of the outstanding Committee I mining issues. Though no
new official text has been issued, the report of the Working Group
4. Id.

5. See U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/BUR/12 (1979).

The term "Final Clauses"

is used to describe the procedural provisions of the treaty covering such aspects
as signature, ratification, status of Annexes, depository, and testimonium clauses.
Also, the use of the term is appropriate when dealing with other procedural matters such as amendments, reservations, relation to other conventions, entry into
force, transitional provisions, denunciation, and participation in the Convention.
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of 21 1 offers a greatly improved prospect of consensus on most issues
and should serve as the basis of final revisions in 1980.
The Authority and the Council

As in Geneva, the most intractable problems involve the organs
of the Authority and the voting procedure of the Council. Article 158 '
provides that the Authority's principal organs consist of an Assembly,
a Council, and a Secretariat. Article 158 is amended to make it clear
that the Assembly and Council must avoid actions "which may derogate from or impede the exercise of specific powers and functions
conferred upon (each other). "

8

This provision makes it clear that

the Assembly cannot interfere with the operations of the Council in
exercising its important functions. This amendment and the changes
made with respect to Article 160 ' eliminate many of the criticisms
expressed by the U.S. Delegation and industry interests. However,
no satisfactory solution to the problem of decision-making in the
Council of the Authority has been determined.
Article 161 addresses the composition, procedure, and voting on
the Council. As amended, it provides that decisions on procedural
questions be made by a majority vote of those members present and
voting. Decisions on substantive questions (a narrow refinement of
what is substance under this section is provided
6. See U.N. Doe. WG 21/2 (1979).

1O)

shall be made by

The Working Group of 21 (WG 21)

is a special negotiating group established in Geneva during the Eighth Session
of UNCLOS. Its function is to seek compromise solutions to remaining "hardcore" Committee I, deep seabed mining, issues.

7. U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (1979).
8. Id.
9. Id. Article 160 deals with the functions and powers of the Assembly.
The United States objects to the reference to the Assembly as the "Supreme
Organ" of the Authority. The first sentence of Article 160 is amended to read
that: "The Assembly, as the sole organ consisting of all members, shall be
considered the supreme organ of the Authority to which the other principal

organs shall be accountable as specifically provided ....

." This is an improve-

ment over the language in the ICNT/Rev. 1 providing that "the Assembly is
the supreme organ . . . and as such shall have the power to establish the general policies . . . to be pursued by the Authority.

10. Article 161 (7) (b), as amended, provides:
(b) Decisions on questions of substance arising under article 162
of paragraph 2 (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (o), (r), (t) in

cases of non-compliance by a contractor or a sponsor, (u), (v) provided that orders issued under this subparagraph may be binding for
no more than 10 days unless confirmed by a decision taken in accordance with subparagraph (c) below, (x) and (y) shall be taken by a
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, provided that
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a two-thirds majority of those members present and voting, "provided
that such majority includes a majority of the members of the Council." " Section 7(c) is illustrative of attempts by certain special
interest groups-such as those industrialized nations whose nationals
are engaging in deep seabed mining development and are likely to
be the first to begin actual mining activities-to ensure that the Council cannot take arbitrary and capricious actions against those special
interests. Section 7(c) provides in part: "In order to promote the
resolution of particularly sensitive issues by means of consensus,
decisions on all other questions of substance shall be taken by a twothirds majority of members present and voting, provided that - members have not cast negative votes." 12
This provision ensures that a small group of Council members,
voting against the majority, can effectively halt actions against their
interests. Current proposals regarding the number of negative votes
needed to block a decision range from as low as five to as many as
ten; not surprisingly, the Group of 77 nations prefer a higher number
than do the industrialized nations. A refinement of the substantiveprocedural distinction, the resolution of the blocking number, and
the determination of membership on the Council 1" still await final
approval during the Ninth Session. The entire issue of decisionmaking on the Council, and representation of all interests on the
Council, must be resolved fairly and equitably if any draft convention
is to be ratified by the vast majority of nations. If such a resolution
cannot be attained in 1980, the Conference could fail.
Deep Seabed Mining
A proposed amendment to Article 140, Benefit of Mankind, provides that activities in the international seabed area be conducted
for the benefit of mankind as a whole, including all countries "and
peoples who have not attained full independence or other selfgoverning status recognized by the United Nations in accordance
such majority includes a majority of the members of the Council. U.N.
Doe. WG 21/2 (1979).
11. Id.
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. The United States and other industrialized nations seek an amendment
to Article 161(2) (Composition, Procedure, and Voting on the Council) to
provide that 50% of the voting members of the Council represent land-based
suppliers of nickel (and other such minerals found in manganese nodules), and
50% represent the consuming nations of the world. However, this proposal is
left for discussion during the Ninth Session.
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with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) and other relevant General Assembly resolutions .... ." " The United States seeks to ensure
that financial benefits from the area will be shared only among those
States who are parties to the Convention. The difficulty raised by
this issue is amplified by its highly political nature. The Group of 77,
in particular, seeks to include political organizations, such as the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, under Article 140. This, of
course, is not politically acceptable to the United States. Compromise
solutions are possible as both sides weigh the overall importance of
the treaty and the problems created by the inclusion of liberation
movements.
Several changes in the ICNT are designed to accommodate mining interests by eliminating uncertainties concerning their future
operations. Article 1, Annex II now provides that: "Title to the
minerals shall pass upon recovery in accordance with this convention,"15 as opposed to its original requirement that title passes in
accordance with a contract between the mining consortia and the
Authority. The amendment stipulates that title passes upon mineral
recovery, with no special actions being required to pass title. This
assures the mining consortia of a property right in mined minerals
without the necessity of, or uncertainty resulting from, further action
by the Authority or the Enterprise.
Article 6, Annex II gives the Authority broad discretion in approving proposed plans of work within the Area." Because of the
potential uncertainty inherent in such a grant of discretionary power,
Article 6 is amended:
All proposed plans of work shall be dealt with in the order in
which they were received, and the Authority shall conduct, as
necessary and as expeditiously as possible, an inquiry into their
compliance with the terms of the present Convention and the
rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority, including the
operational requirements, the financial contributions and the undertakings concerning the transfer of technology. As soon as the
issues under investigation have been settled, the Authority shall
approve such plans of work, provided that they conform to the
uniform and non-discriminatory requirements established by the

14. U.N. Doc. WG 21/2 (1979), at 1 (emphasis added).
15. Id. (emphasis added).

16. The "Area" is defined in Article I as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and
subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."
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rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority. . ..
phasis added).

17

(em-

Under the proposed system of exploration and exploitation in
the Area, applicants for work plans will submit data on an area large
enough to accommodate two mining operations. One of these areas
is reserved for the Enterprise, with the Enterprise selecting the area
it wishes to reserve. Under Article 8, applicants are required to provide the Authority with the "data necessary to make the assessment
of the value of the sites," so that the Authority can "designate the
part which is to be reserved solely for the conduct of Activities by
the Authority . . ." Is It is unclear from this language whether the
Authority, after receiving the available data from an applicant, could
require the applicant, at great cost, to obtain additional data. To
clarify this and to ensure that the applicant provides all available
data at the time that the application is submitted, Article 8 is amended
to provide that the applicant submit "all the data obtained by him
with respect to both parts of the area." " The reservation of a site by
the Authority may be delayed if the Authority "requests an independent expert to assess whether all data required by this article
has been submitted to the Authority." 20 This provision eliminates
a potential added cost to mining interests in their preparation of
mining sites. If the Authority is able to require extensive additional data not available to an applicant, the increased costs as well
as the potential for discriminatory and unwarranted demands for
data, could clearly frustrate mining activities.
Closely associated with the protections of Article 8 are those of
Article 13, Annex II, Transfer of Data. The operator of a mining
activity must provide the Authority with all data "necessary and
relevant to the effective implementation of the powers and functions
of the principle organs of the Authority in respect to the area covered
by the plan of work." 21 However, in order to protect operators from
disclosing this so-called proprietary data, Article 13 (3) provides that
such transferred data "deemed to be proprietary, shall not be disclosed by the Authority." 22 These protections are necessary since
proprietary data is often acquired at great cost, but would be
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

U.N. Doc. WG 21/2 (1979), at 4.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.10/Rev.1
Id.

(1979), at 12.
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valueless if unnecessarily disclosed. The United States Delegation seeks
the additional clarification that data should be considered proprietary
if the would-be transferor so deems it. However, this provision is
not included in the ICNT because the negotiators feel that such
is the case without having to specifically so provide.23
Another accommodation to mining interests is the revision of
Article 2, Annex II, Prospecting. The ICNT/Rev.1 provides that
prospecting is to be conducted only after the Authority receives
adequate written assurance that the prospector shall comply with
the Convention and the rules of the Authority in regard to environmental protection and training personnel nominated by the Authority.
This training requirement is not acceptable to the mining industry
because it is not subject to guidelines or standards, thereby posing
an unknown financial burden on industry. This oversight is corrected
in the newest proposals which require prospectors to comply with
the rules and regulations of the Authority concerning "co-operation
in training programs according to Articles 143 and 144 ... ," 24
Another serious problem found in Article (2) (1) (D), Annex II
concerns the Authority's powers to close mining sites for prospecting
if "available data indicates the risk of irreparable harm to a unique
environment or unjustifiable interference with other uses of the
Area." 25 From an environmental point of view, this provision seems
most reasonable. However, this grant of discretion to a political
organization, such as the Authority, is not acceptable to the mining
interests. It is estimated that the cost of site preparation may be as
high as $100 million. If industry is to commit this amount to an
already highly speculative venture, they must be assured that a
political organ-wherein its interests are not adequately representedcannot arbitrarily and indiscriminately curtail its prospecting operations. Such a decision should not rest with the Authority, but should
23. See U.S. Delegation Report, Resumed Eighth Session of The Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, July 16-August
24, 1979, at 13.
24. Articles 143 and 144 deal with Marine Scientific Research and Transfer
of Technology, respectively, within the Area. Under Article 144, States Parties
assume the obligation to "cooperate in promoting the transfer of technology
and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area.... ." The Transfer
of Technology provisions make it clear that technology, if available on the
open market, is to be purchased at fair market prices. However, States Parties
agree to assist the Authority in obtaining technology in the event it is not available for purchase, or if the fair market purchase price is excessive.
25. See U.N. Doe., supra note 14, at 1-2.
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be left to the Council (or an agency of the Council), where political
pressures can be minimized, thus ensuring that site closings are truly
based on "available data." Due to this objection, Section I(D) is
eliminated from the current proposals on prospecting.
The subject of production limits has been discussed throughout
the Committee I negotiations, and the Eighth Session was no exception. The basic concept upon which all agree is that to satisfy the
land-based suppliers of nickel and copper (and other metals commercially mined from the Area), and to protect their mining industries
and economies from the competition for world markets in these metals,
certain limitations must be placed on the amounts of minerals mined
from the Area. The difficulty ensues when one attempts to place a tonnage limit on a particular metal, such as nickel, when one cannot accurately estimate the cost of mining and future world market prices.
However, all agree that the mining consortia must make a profit, and in
order to be profitable, they must be able to sell sufficient quantities of
mined metals.
Article 151, Production Policies, is unacceptable to the United
States and the mining interests,26 and no acceptable proposals are
included in the Committee reports. It is clear that much negotiating
during the Ninth Session is necessary to settle this important and
highly complex issue.
A related and as yet unresolved issue is the question of royalty
payments by mining industries to the Enterprise." Basically, the
Authority must have adequate capital to finance its operations, and
it is presumed that the bulk of this capital will come from royalties.
However, mining consortia must have flexibility in the amounts they
pay so that the profitability of their operations is assured. A flat
percentage rate, based on the market value of the mined minerals,
is not acceptable because it does not take into consideration unexpected operation costs. A fixed charge based on mining consortia
profits from minerals mined in the Area is also unworkable because
the mining consortia must be encouraged to reinvest profits into
the development of other mining sites, as well as technology and
26. See U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 23, at 21.
27. In the event mining activities are conducted pursuant to a joint venture
agreement with the Enterprise, the question of royalty payment is to be settled
under the provisions of the agreement. Therefore, problems of royalty payments arise only in relation to activities by private mining consortia in the Area.
It has not been finally decided whether the Enterprise must make royalty
payments to the Authority.
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equipment research. In addition, due to the high initial cost of mining,

larger profits are needed at the early stages of mining operations in
order to repay loans. Finally, the consortia are likely to mine, process,
and market these minerals. Questions arise as to when the consortia

are to be taxed: at the time of mining, after processing, or after
marketing.
However, the proposed revisions to Article 12, Financial Terms
of Contracts, are an improvement:
The structure of the new article represents a carefully balanced
package which attempts to meet the concerns of the potential
When
seabed mining countries and the developing countries ....
the contractor's profitability is low, payments to the Authority
will result in a smaller reduction in profitability. When the contractor's profits are high, the Authority will share in a propor28
tionately higher part of those profits.

Negotiators are optimistic that these technical problems can be resolved early in the Ninth Session. All agree that flexibility is needed;
therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that this heretofore extremely
difficult issue is now close to resolution.

Financing the Authority
Another difficult issue requiring attention in 1980 is the question
of financing the Authority. The goal of the Conference -is to es-

tablish a viable Enterprise which can begin mining operations at the
same time that the first commercial mining operations take place.
To do this, the Authority must possess large sums of money with
which to purchase technology, equipment, and obtain the best trained
personnel.
The United States makes it clear that it will not directly subsidize U.S. nationals in their mining activities. As a result, Convention
provisions requiring direct payments to the Enterprise by the United
States would meet with disapproval if such a provision were included when the draft convention is presented to the U.S. Senate.
Current proposals require member nations to provide interest-free
loans and loan guarantees. The United States and other industrialized

nations accept these provisions. Since only technical questions concerning the amount of money and the manner in which it will be

28. See U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 23, at 21.
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provided remain, negotiations on this question should be concluded
during the first part of the Ninth Session.
Outlook for the Ninth Session
As noted, the most encouraging news from the resumed Eighth
Session is the progress made on the outstanding Committee I issues.
These problems continue to be the most 9difficult to solve, but it now
appears that their resolution is at hand.
Several difficult issues addressed in Committee II remain essentially unsettled. The definition of the outer limits of the Continental Shelf (Negotiating Group 6), the delimitation of maritime
boundaries between opposite and adjacent States (Negotiating
Group 7), and revenue sharing for shelf resources recovered beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines have been discussed, but final
resolution remains to be accomplished during the Ninth Session.
Article 76(5) 0 is an attempt to accommodate both the broad
margin States who seek to extend their continental shelf to as great a
distance from the baseline as possible, and the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, with no shelf or very narrow shelves,
who seek a share of the wealth from the continental shelves beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines. To complicate matters, unresolved technical questions concerning the handling of oceanic ridges
are raised.
Another problem arises from the Sri Lanka situation. The Sri
Lanka Delegation seeks a specific exception from certain provisions
because its continental shelf extends as far as 500 nautical miles from
its baselines. It is undesirable for the Convention to be burdened
with single State exceptions because this opens the door for other
States to seek exceptions to Convention provisions. However, the
negotiators do not want to put Sri Lanka and other States in the position of having to make reservations to certain treaty provisions. Due
29. According to Bernardo Zuleta, Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary-General to UNCLOS, the potential benefits from manganese
Perhaps the realization that the
nodules has been "grossly exaggerated."
amount of money to be received by individual nations (160 nations are expected

to receive some royalties from mining activities) is likely to be small has resulted in a willingness to solve the outstanding Committee I deep seabed
mining issues.

See U.N. Mining Treaty Near, The Plain Dealer, Aug. 16,

1979.
30. See U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 23, at 52.
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to the highly political nature of this problem, its resolution will not
be easy and is likely to result in extended debate in 1980.
A closely associated problem is the question of revenue sharing
for shelf resources beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines. Two
aspects of this are addressed: (1) the system and rate of revenue
sharing; and (2) the identification of which States must pay, and
which States are to receive the revenues. Though the general consensus is that Article 8(D) is adequate, questions arise concerning
the grace periods and the rate to be paid. Whatever numbers are
finally chosen, they must be such as will not discourage exploration
and exploitation.
The problem of the delimitation of maritime boundaries between
opposite and adjacent states has essentially three components: (1) the
criteria to be applied in delimiting the boundaries; (2) the measures
to be applied in the interim period pending agreement; and (3) dispute settlement.
Perhaps the most difficult issues faced by any State are those
relating to their boundaries. No State is going to give up land or
water territory unless absolutely necessary. Thus, it is extremely difficult to provide the required mechanism for boundary delimitation
in a comprehensive treaty. It now appears that any boundary disputes
raised prior to the effective date of the Treaty are not to be governed
by the Treaty. Thus, all coastal States have an opportunity to make
their positions known in advance so that traditional boundary settlement mechanisms can be applied."' Technical problems remain in
these three critical areas. However, there is widespread agreement as
to the general principles, and finalization of the applicable provisions
should proceed with little difficulty.
The negotiations in Committee III are substantially completed.
According to its Chairman, Ambassador Alexander Yankov of Yugoslavia, Committee III efforts:
were directed to the consideration of the pending substantive
issues relating to the regime for the conduct of marine scientific
31. Id. at 51, 57. Article 74 discusses the delimitation of the Exclusive
Economic Zone between adjacent and opposite States, and Article 83 deals with
the delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent and opposite States.
Both Articles provide that delimitation "shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate, the median
or equidistance line, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances."
Failure to so agree shall result in resort to the procedures in Part XV of the
Convention.
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research on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured as
well as the problem of settlement of disputes relating to the
of this conveninterpretation or implementation of the provisions
32
tion with regard to marine scientific research.
Through the combination of formal and informal consultations, compromise formulas on technical issues are established, which, in the
opinion of the Chairman, "have a substantial degree of support as
It appears
to provide a reasonable prospect for a consensus....",
that the once intractable issue of marine scientific research on the
continental shelf beyond 200 miles from the baselines can now be
resolved. Once this is completed, the remaining Committee III problems should be easily resolved.
Treaty Implementation
As noted, the conclusion of substantive negotiations is anticipated
early in the Ninth Session. However, the end of substantive negotiations does not guarantee successful treaty implementation. Upon the
conclusion of substantive negotiations, the Conference must consider
the questions of amendments, reservations, the relation of the Treaty
to other conventions, entry into force, transitional provisions, denunciation, and participation in the Conference. The most serious of
these are the questions of amendments and reservations.
Central to the amendments issue is the belief that the "package
deal" concept of the Conference must not be disturbed. This view,
in essence, means that the Convention must be taken as a whole,
and if part fails, the whole Convention fails. Though most States
favor some formal amendment procedure, many realize the potential
for reopening substantive negotiations in areas once thought to be
fully settled.
Closely related to the amendments issue is the question of reservations. 4 Some delegations indicate that their governments may
seek to reserve on certain Convention provisions. The goal of the
32. Report of the Chairman of Committee I1, August 21, 1979, at 2.
33. Id. at 3.
34. "Reservations," as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, "means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a
state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions
of the treaty in their application to that state." See W. BisHoP, INTERNATIONAL
LAw, CASES AND MATERIALS

124-41 (3d ed. 1971).
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Conference is to produce a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty that
is accepted by the vast majority of States. If many States make reservations to numerous provisions, the concept of the "package deal"
is destroyed, and the Convention's aims of uniformity and comprehensiveness are undermined. Most delegates support the position that
no reservations to the Convention should be allowed. However, the
political realities of the situation dictate that some reservations are
necessary. According to the United States Delegation:
Many of the delegations noted that liberal reservation provisions
would destroy the consensus procedure of the Conference. One
solution preferred would categorize the provisions of the treaty
according to their status vis-a-vis reservations. Those provisions
embodying "Jus cogens," or reflecting customary international law,
or fundamental to the package deal would not be subject to

reservations

. . ..

However, lengthy negotiations could ensue as to what is reflective of customary international law, or what is "fundamental to the
package deal." The Conference will address this critical issue during
the Ninth Session, no satisfactory solution being found during the
Eighth Session. The Conference leadership, from both the industrialized world and the Group of 77, recognize that a prolonged
reservation process could destroy the Convention. It is because of
the widespread recognition of the potential impact of reservations
that many are optimistic that the Convention will remain essentially
intact after that process.
It is generally believed that entry into force, transitional provisions, and denunciation raise few problems. However, entry into
force does raise three issues: (1) the extent that the 1958 Conventions are superseded; (2) the effect of the new treaty on other United
Nations sponsored treaties; and (3) the effect of this treaty on other
bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. The general consensus is that where there is no inconsistency, other treaties and
agreements are not affected. However, the Law of the Sea Treaty
must prevail where there is conflict, although an attempt will be
made to construe all agreements to minimize this problem,
The participation question is the subject of some intense disagreement. Universal participation with early entry into force is the main
goal. There is some dispute, however, as to what entities can become
35. See U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 23, at 47.
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parties to the Convention. Five categories of entities are discussed:
States, regional economic communities, such as the European Economic Community (EEC), Trust Territories, non-self-governing territories, and liberation movements, such as the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). The negotiations in the Informal Plenary on
Final Clauses have become politically-motivated on this point. The
United States seeks to limit parties to "all States," with a resolution to
the effect that other entities such as the EEC can participate."
The United States opposes the participation of dependent Trust
Territories or liberation movements, such as the PLO, in the Treaty.
The United States feels that the inclusion of these parties could preclude the widespread ratification essential to the viability of the Treaty,
as well as raising serious international law problems.

Conclusion
It is the goal of the Conference to conclude substantive negotiations early in the Ninth Session, with the signing of a draft convention in Caracas in 1981. Although several difficult issues remain
unresolved, it is generally believed that this goal can be achieved. 7
All agree that the time to conclude the Conference has come, and the
sense of urgency expressed by President Amerasinghe is shared by
the majority of the delegates. The progress of the Eighth Session of
UNCLOS is illustrative of the willingness of the Delegations to seek
workable compromise solutions to difficult issues and to conclude
the negotiating process as quickly as possible. It is hoped that the
potential problems raised by unlimited amendments and reservations
can be avoided, thus removing the only real obstacle to a successful
conclusion of the Conference.
36. Id. at 49-50.
37. According to the U.S. Delegation Report:

The forward momentum generated now seems sufficient to enable
the Conference to resolve the difficult remaining issues next year in a

generally satisfactory manner. At this point, the major potential obstacle to achievement of a generally acceptable treaty are the danger
of reopening compromises already reached, the loss of sufficient will
to resolve the remaining issues, or the unraveling of the intricate and
delicate package during formal proceedings on a final text. There is a
substantial risk that one of these obstacles will emerge. But if a "critical mass" of leaders determined to achieve and protect the consensus
can be maintained, there is no longer any reason to believe the obstacles
will prove to be insuperable. Id. at 8.

